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ABSTRACT
A problem with recent work about the relationship between metaphysics and science,
especially in the theorizing of those who identify as “naturalized metaphysicians”, is the spotty,
metaphorical characterization of what it means for science to “constrain” metaphysics. The most
robust account of scientific constraint on metaphysical theorizing is advanced by James Ladyman
and Don Ross in their 2007 book Every Thing Must Go. Ladyman & Ross claim that the only
legitimate metaphysical hypotheses are those that unify two previously disparate scientific
explanations. I will critique Ladyman & Ross’ account of naturalized metaphysics (and, by extension,
their view of science’s constraint on metaphysics), and offer an alternative view of naturalized
metaphysics as a practice of constructing physically possible models of reality. This account yields a

different view of science’s constraint on metaphysics, specifically, that models must be physically
possible in order to be of methodological and heuristic use to scientists.
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1

INTRODUCTION

A problem with much recent theorizing about the relationship between metaphysics and
science, especially in the theorizing of those who identify as “naturalized metaphysicians”1, is the
spotty, metaphorical characterization of what it means for science to “constrain” metaphysics. Most
metaphysicians take consistency with science as a desideratum of a metaphysical theory but analyze
the meaning of ‘consistency’ differently and demand it to varying degrees.2 The most robust
account of scientific constraint on metaphysical theorizing is advanced by James Ladyman and Don
Ross in their 2007 book Every Thing Must Go. Ladyman & Ross (henceforward referred to as L&R)
argue that the current state of analytic metaphysics is a sorry one, suspiciously reliant on what they
see as intuition-mongering divorced from the empirical-scientific realities that would substantially
inform debates on fundamental ontology. On their view, metaphysics is strongly constrained by
science insofar as the only useful role metaphysics could serve is the unification of previously
disparate scientific hypotheses; any metaphysical theorizing which cannot be pressed into the service
of scientific unification should be summarily discarded. I will critique L&R’s view of naturalized
metaphysics (henceforth referred to as NM) and offer a competing account of how NM should
conduct itself. Section I will detail L&R’s account of NM, focusing on the argument for their
“Principle of Naturalistic Closure” (hereafter referred to as PNC), which demarcates legitimate and
illegitimate metaphysical hypotheses by their ability to unify two previously disparate specific

“Naturalized Metaphysics” or “Scientific Metaphysics” is a term that is still in search of a rigorous
definition by those who fly its banner. Definitions abound, but, in the attempt to be as neutral as possible,
I want to describe a naturalized metaphysician as someone who thinks that metaphysical inquiry is
constrained by science in a stronger sense than traditional metaphysicians who demand only that
metaphysics not contradict the results of our best science. This is deliberately vague, capturing as it does
the plurality of different ideas of what it means for metaphysics to be robustly constrained by science.
2 See Sider (2001), Ladyman & Ross (2007), Maddy (2007), Maudlin (2007), Paul (2012), and Bryant (2017),
for evidence of the claim that metaphysicians commonly endorse scientific constraints on the practice of
metaphysics.
1
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scientific hypotheses. Section II will give two reasons for why their justification of the PNC actually
undermines the prospects of this view of NM. Section III will address the issues raised by L&R’s
deference to scientific practice, namely the entailed commitment to the truth-conduciveness of a
naturalized version of inference to the best explanation (henceforth referred to as IBE) in science.
Section IV will respond to an objection that takes the form of an analogy between L&R’s naturalized
IBE and Bayesian conditionalization: If we take subjective Bayesian conditionalization to be
legitimate for theory confirmation, why is naturalized IBE’s subjectivity a problem for theory
choice? Section V will explore how L&R’s view of NM can be salvaged by reconceptualizing the
project of NM as one of building physically possible models of reality. This shift of focus to
physically possible model-building also yields a different account of how science constrains
metaphysical practice.
2

LADYMAN & ROSS’ ARGUMENT FOR UNIFICAITON

For L&R, legitimate metaphysical theorizing must obey (along with the “Primacy of Physics
Constraint”, which won’t be addressed in this paper)3 what they call the “Principle of Naturalistic
Closure”:
Any new metaphysical claim that is to be taken seriously at time t should be
motivated by, and only by, the service it would perform, if true, in showing how two
or more specific scientific hypotheses, at least one of which is drawn from
fundamental physics, jointly explain more than the sum of what is explained by the
two hypotheses taken separately.4

The Primacy of Physics Constraint (PPC) states: “Special science hypotheses that conflict with
fundamental physics, or such consensus as there is in fundamental physics, should be rejected for that
reason alone. Fundamental physical hypotheses are not symmetrically hostage to the conclusions of the
special sciences.” Ladyman & Ross (2007) Pg. 37.
4
Ibid. Pg. 30.
3

4

L&R’s justification for the PNC is, simply, that working scientists take unification seriously,
and so it should be the standard by which metaphysical claims are judged:

Why should radical methodological naturalists suppose that there is any ‘responsible
and significant’ job for metaphysics to do? Our answer is that one of the important
things we want from science is a relatively unified picture of the world. We do not
assert this as a primitive norm. Rather…it is exemplified in the actual history of
science. Scientists are reluctant to pose or to accept hypotheses that are stranded
from the otherwise connected body of scientific beliefs. This is rational, reflecting
the fact that a stranded hypothesis represents a mystery, and therefore calls out for
scientific work aimed at eliminating it. It also reflects the fact that an important
source of justification for a hypothesis is its standing in reciprocal explanatory
relationships—networked consilience relationships—with other hypotheses.5
The fact that working scientists take explanatory unification seriously as a theoretical virtue
of scientific practice is what justifies, for L&R, the privileging of it as a norm for naturalized
metaphysical inquiry. Theoretical virtues are desiderata like simplicity, explanatory power, predictive
power, consilience, etc. According to L&R, unification is the overriding theoretical virtue in
scientific inquiry. Since scientists take unification very seriously and naturalized metaphysicians
ought to model their practices on the sciences to the best of their ability, a unificationist and
naturalist justification of metaphysical explanation is offered in the form of the Principle of
Naturalistic Closure. What is the motivation for the normative claim that NM ought to model its
practices on the sciences? L&R’s response to this query is that science is the sole reliable method for
coming to objective knowledge of the natural world:

5

Ibid. Pg. 28.
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Since science just is our set of institutional error filters for the job of discovering the
objective character of the world—that and no more but also that and no less— science
respects no domain restrictions and will admit no epistemological rivals (such as
natural theology or purely speculative metaphysics). With respect to anything that is a
putative fact about the world, scientific institutional processes are absolutely and
exclusively authoritative.6
On this scientistic view7, in order for metaphysics to be truth-conducive it must by necessity
model its practices on the sciences, which is why L&R are highly deferential to scientific practice—
there simply is no other game in town. In the following section, I will examine why this deference
to the practices of working scientists undermines L&R’s account of NM.
3 THE DANGERS OF DEFERENCE
L&R’s deferring to scientific practice may seem like an intuitive move for a naturalized
metaphysician to make: if being a naturalist involves taking science seriously, surely part of taking
science seriously involves a high—if not overriding—degree of deference on the part of philosophy
to scientific practice. But this deference causes problems for L&R: First, if it is the case that we
should privilege those theoretical virtues that scientists take as relevant for theory choice, no
compelling evidence has been offered for why scientific unification, rather than any other theoretical
virtue or some combination of them, should be the standard by which metaphysical explanations are
judged. It is true that unification has been valued throughout the history of science and it is obvious
that contemporary working scientists do take unification seriously when comparing competing
hypotheses. But it has not been made clear that scientists historically and currently take it to be the
supreme theoretical virtue. Scientists then and now also take seriously predictive power, explanatory
novelty, explanatory depth, ontological and mathematical simplicity, aesthetic criteria like “elegance”

6
7

Ibid. Emphasis theirs.
The chapter the above quote is cited from is titled “In Defence of Scientism”.
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or “beauty”, and so on. For L&R’s justification of the PNC to succeed, they need to clarify why
scientists take the theoretical virtue of unification more seriously than any other theoretical virtue to
the point where any theory that unifies best wins out over every competitor.
No explicit case is made for unification as the supreme theoretical virtue of working
scientists in Every Thing Must Go, and I don’t think it’s a plausible case to make in general. Different
scientists will value unification, explanatory depth, simplicity, etc. to different degrees and will weigh
their sets of preferences idiosyncratically. That scientists historically takes unification seriously is not
enough to establish that it’s the only thing they take seriously.8 Since unification is not obviously
special—just one virtue among many that we use in judging the plausibility of scientific and
metaphysical hypotheses—L&R’s motivation for the PNC is vitiated, because scientific practice
doesn’t really justify the claims that they make on its behalf. Prima facie, if we take deference to the
theory choice preferences of working scientists seriously, it seems that we should let in all the
theoretical virtues that science takes seriously as relevant to our assessment of a particular theory.
But Ladyman & Ross cannot simply expand the list of virtues to include all the ones scientists
actually value, as doing that is tantamount to abandoning any conception of constraint on
metaphysics by science, since metaphysical hypotheses are constrained only by the PNC, and the
PNC is not well-motivated. Furthermore, expanding the list of theoretical virtues opens the space
for metaphysicians to claim that their theories satisfy these other virtues even if they don’t unify two
scientific explanations, defanging L&R’s critique and calling into question the very possibility of NM
as distinct from standard metaphysical practice. Because Ladyman & Ross’ strategy is to enforce
constraints on metaphysical practice by declaring only a very restricted subset of theoretical virtues

It may be further argued that unification is only an important theoretical virtue in some sciences, namely
physics and chemistry. Other sciences seem to tolerate (or even encourage) much more disunity than a
unificationist could stomach.
8
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(namely, scientific unification) as relevant to theory choice, expanding the list of relevant theoretical
virtues is not a live option for them, if they are intent on offering a principled account of science’s
strong constraint on metaphysical practice, which they are.
Perhaps L&R can respond by shifting the focus of their view from the theoretical virtues to
the comparative reliability of scientific method vis a vis metaphysical method, and so defend their
picture of scientific constraint by appealing to the reliability of scientific explanation vis a vis
empirically ungrounded metaphysics. In a later article, Ladyman does just this, and defends the
truth-conduciveness of IBE in science while questioning its truth-conduciveness in metaphysics.
The next section will critique Ladyman’s argument and make clear why NM cannot be conducted
merely by adopting a naturalist criterion of theory choice for IBE.
4

CRITIQUING NATURALIZED IBE

Before evaluating Ladyman’s defense of scientific IBE (and, by extension, IBE in NM), a
definition of IBE is in order. Following Douven (2002), we can give IBE the following formal
definition:
IBE: Given evidence E and potential explanations H1…Hn of E, infer to the
(probable/approximate) truth of the Hi that explains E best.9
“Explains best” is a phrase that needs unpacking. One standard account of what it is for a
theory to “explain the best” is that it possesses the most theoretical virtues vis a vis competing
theories.10 Whatever theory “scores” best in terms of satisficing a weighted plurality of the
theoretical virtues is the theory that we ought to infer based on evidence E.

9

Douven (2002). Pg. 356.
See Thagard (1978) and McMullin (1996).

10
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In his 2012 article “Science, Metaphysics, and Method”, Ladyman claims that there is a
legitimate distinction between IBE as it is used in science and IBE as it is used in metaphysics. What
is supposed to distinguish science’s reliance on IBE from the analytic metaphysician’s is that
scientific IBE operates within a tradition where it has a track record of inductive success. Scientific
IBEs, like Darwin’s formulation of the principle of natural selection as an independent alternative to
the theory of independent divine creation, are legitimate because they are verifiable through
empirical inquiry and have indeed been verified. IBE in metaphysics, on the other hand, is
untethered from any form of worldly epistemic constraint. There are no empirical verification
conditions for, say, David Lewis’ best systems approach to ascertaining the laws of nature by
determining which best strike a balance between simplicity in the number of axioms and strength in
the amount of information about the world these axioms impart.11 Metaphysical IBE, then, is
illegitimate by Ladyman’s lights because there is no connection to empirical success, so appeals to
explanatory power are compelling in scientific IBE but ultimately idle in metaphysical theorizing:

Explanatory power plays the role it does in theory choice because of the relationship
between theoretical explanation and the empirical virtues of scientific theories. We
have inductive grounds for believing that pursuing simplicity and explanatory power
in science will lead to empirical success, but no such grounds where we are dealing
with distinctively metaphysical explanations, since the latter is completely decoupled
from empirical success.12

Because NM is supposed to generate metaphysical theses that are testable by our best
current science via the same methods of IBE that scientists use, IBE in NM is taken to be reliable
because the explanatory virtues are not decoupled from empirical success in the way it is for

11
12

Lewis (1973).
Ladyman (2012). Pg. 46.
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metaphysical IBE.13 There are two problems with this justification of IBE in science and in NM.
The first problem comes from the previously made point that the theory-choice preferences of
working scientists are heterogeneous. It’s not clear that any working scientist has exactly the same
list of theoretical virtues, and this is reflected in diversity of thought in the philosophical literature
on explanatory virtues and theory choice: Quine (1966) takes parsimony as supreme in theory
choice; Lewis (1973), as previously mentioned, evaluates candidate laws of nature on the basis of
their simplicity in being axiomatized and the strength of their informational content; Lipton (2004)
claims that a theory’s ability to unify disparate phenomena, via a specification of a mechanism that
explains with precision why the explanans is the way it is constitutes a best explanation in every case;
and so on. Other accounts, like Keas (2017), propose upwards of twelve different theoretical virtues.
As is made clear from even this cursory glance at the literature on explanation and theory choice,
there are myriad ways of listing and organizing the theoretical virtues. This diversity of opinion
regarding what actually counts as a theoretical virtue is a point against the reliability of IBE in NM
and in science. If theoretical virtues are taken to be confirmationally relevant— that is, if every bona
fide theoretical virtue must raise the degree of confirmation of a hypothesis that possesses that virtue
to a greater degree than all of its theoretical competitors (and, correspondingly, that the degree of
confirmation of losing theories is lowered by not possessing that virtue)—then leaving
confirmationally relevant virtues out or adding spurious virtues in that are taken to be
confirmationally relevant but in fact are confirmationally idle will affect what theory one chooses. So
even if we can agree on a particular list of theoretical virtues, there is still a further question about
how these virtues are to be weighed against one another; especially when the virtues (like, say,
predictive power and explanatory depth) stand in tension with one another, which they often do. If

The requirement that metaphysical theses be in-principle testable is entailed by L&R’s endorsement of a
“non-positivist” version of verificationism. See ETMG, pg. 29 for more.
13
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the hypothesis with the right arrangement of theoretical virtues is most likely to be true, then each
theoretical virtue we take into consideration must be confirmationally relevant and must be correctly
assigned a weight relative to the rest of the theoretical virtues for us to accurately determine which
hypothesis is most likely to be true. Without both of these conditions satisfied, we cannot expect
that our answers to the question “Which theory T explains evidence E the best?” will track what is
actually the case. And, given the heterogeneity found in working scientists’ listing and weighing of
the theoretical virtues, it appears that these two conditions aren’t satisfied, so Ladyman cannot
explain IBE’s success in the sciences by claiming that one only needs a partial list of confirmationally
relevant virtues, and each scientist possesses a partial list. And this endangers the efficacy of IBE in
science and NM.
The upshot is that without an antecedently known and objective hierarchy of theoretical
virtues, we cannot safely assume that we are making the right IBE. Even if we agreed upon a
particular list of theoretical virtues, if we value simplicity more than is warranted, or undervalue
unification, etc. we may very well choose a theory that is more likely to be false over a theory that is
more likely to be true if our agreed-upon listing turns out to be wrong. Therefore, any defender of
IBE’s efficacy in science or in NM must answer the following two questions: What are the actual
theoretical virtues, and, after we’ve decided what they are, how do we go about weighing them?
Ladyman is silent on this question.
These questions raise yet another issue, which is: How could we know when we had the
right organization of theoretical virtues? Because the theoretical virtues are various, and their criteria
of weighting and application are not easily ascertained, it seems that even if everyone were to agree a
definitive list of theoretical virtues and a weighting of them, we’d still be left with the question of
whether we were right and why. The proper listing of theoretical virtues is, presumably, not
something that can be determined a priori, but if we try to look to the history of science for guidance

11

on what theoretical virtues reliably lead to the best theories, we quickly find that it is littered with
theories that were simple, explanatorily deep, unificatory, and false. If the goal of scientific IBE isn’t
to increase our understanding but rather to choose the best theory—the theory that is most likely to be
true—it isn’t enough to have agreement that there are certain theoretical virtues and that they are
important. And without a clear weighting scheme of virtues and an epistemic situation in which we
know that our weighting scheme is correct, it seems as if we don’t seem to have an answer to the
crucial question of “Which theory T explains evidence E the best?”, which means that we have no
prima facie indication that IBE as we have characterized it is a reliable argument form for truthconducive inferences in science or in NM, even if the putative best explanation results in an increase
in understanding.14
The prior claim assumes that one could understand a false explanation to greater or lesser
degrees, or, in a stronger fashion, that a theory’s being true is not a necessary or sufficient condition
for understanding a theory. This is quite plausible. There are people who understand how Ptolemaic
epicycles work better than others, despite that theory being false. Likewise with phlogiston theory,
or any other now-debunked scientific theory. If all it took for an IBE to be successful was its
engendering reports of increased understanding, then yes, there are plenty of successful IBEs and
the standard of adequacy for the argument form is quite low. But I take it that is not all that
scientists and naturalized metaphysicians expect of IBE. They don’t just expect IBE to increase their
understanding—they expect that theoretical virtues are confirmationally relevant, that the most
explanatory theory is the most likely to be true and so the best theory to adopt among all
competitors. But if understanding of a theory is separable from its being true or false, then there’s a

It may be that there are some forms of IBE which aren’t predicated on an assessment of theoretical
virtues. But I have trouble understanding how else we might appeal to the explanatory considerations
brought to bear by a theory other than by appeal to the theoretical virtues.
14
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conflation in what proponents of IBE take their arguments to be doing: increasing our
understanding on the one hand and giving us a guide to the theory that is most likely to be true on
the other.
The second problem with Ladyman’s justification of IBE in the sciences is that it’s not at all
clear how inductively successful IBE in the sciences is, both in comparison to metaphysical IBE and
on its own terms. This is because we don’t have insight into the rate of success of IBE in science
and metaphysics. This objection is analogous to the base rate fallacy objection found in the literature
on the no-miracles argument and the pessimistic meta-induction.15 The base rate fallacy is a common
statistical fallacy where reasoners underweight or ignore the base rates of event probabilities and
overweight individual information pertaining to the event in question. The classic example of the
base rate fallacy comes from Kahneman & Tversky (1972):

Two cab companies operate in a given city, the Blue and the Green (according to the
color of cab they run). Eighty-five percent of the cabs in the city are Blue, and the
remaining 15% are Green. A cab was involved in a hit-and-run accident at night. A
witness later identified the cab as a Green cab. The court tested the witness’ ability to
distinguish between Blue and Green cabs under nighttime visibility conditions. It
found that the witness was able to identify each color correctly about 80% of the
time, but confused it with the other color about 20% of the time. What do you think
are the chances that the errant cab was indeed Green, as the witness claimed?16

Many people, when faced with this problem, surmise that the chance of the cab’s being
green is identical to the witness’s rate of correct color identification, that is, 80%. This is not the

15
16

See Magnus and Callender (2004) for the argument as it pertains to the scientific realism debate.
Kahneman and Tversky (1972).
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case. The proper way to determine the likelihood that the cab was green given witness testimony of
a green cab is given by Bayes’ Rule:

𝑃𝑟(𝐴|𝐵) =

𝑃𝑟(𝐵|𝐴) ∗ 𝑃𝑟(𝐴)
𝑃𝑟(𝐵)

Where Pr(𝐴|𝐵) is the conditional probability (i.e. the likelihood) of event A given event B,
Pr(𝐵|𝐴) is the likelihood of event B given event A, and Pr(A) and Pr(B) are, respectively, the
probability of A or B’s occurring independently. Filling in Bayes’ Rule with the cab example we get:
𝑃𝑟(𝐺|𝑔) =

𝑃𝑟(𝐺|𝑔) 𝑃𝑟(𝑔|𝐺) 𝑃𝑟(𝐺) 0.8 0.15 12
=
∗
=
∗
=
𝑃𝑟(𝐵|𝑔) 𝑃𝑟(𝑔|𝐵) 𝑃𝑟(𝐵) 0.2 0.85 17

Where (𝐺|𝑔) is the probability of the offending cab being green given a witness testimony
of a green cab, (𝐵|𝑔) is the probability of the offending cab being blue given a witness testimony of
a green cab, (𝑔|𝐺)the probability of a witness testimony of a green cab given the cab’s being green,
(𝑔|𝐵) the probability of a witness testimony of a green cab given the cab’s being blue, and Pr(G)
and Pr(B) being the base rate probabilities of a cab’s being green or blue respectively. After applying
Bayes’ Rule as above we have:
𝑃𝑟(𝐺|𝑔) =

12
= .41
12 + 17

This means that the probability of the offending cab’s being green given a witness testimony
of a green cab is not 80% but rather 41%. In one study by Bar-Hillel (1980) only about 10% of study
participants gave an answer even roughly approximate to the correct calculation as given by Bayes’
Rule.
The upshot of this discussion as it pertains to Ladyman is that we can’t say that IBE has a
track record of success in the sciences but not in metaphysics without knowledge of the base rate of
successful IBEs found in both. Since we don’t have the base rates available to us, we cannot assert

14

that IBE in science has a track record of inductive success—perhaps the probability of an IBE’s
being correct in science is less than that of chance, which surely indicates a method that is not
reliable. Furthermore, we are unlikely ever to discover the base rate of successful IBEs in science or
metaphysics: There are too many IBEs in science to count and there are no clear criteria of
verification for IBEs in metaphysics, so we can’t calculate the base rates of successful IBEs in either
discipline. While we can gesture toward greater levels of convergence in scientific consensus as a
reason to suppose more success in inferring the best explanation and so a better track record in
comparison to IBEs in metaphysics, this is ultimately an intuition that is in search of the
probabilities that would justify it, since it could still be the case that IBE is unreliable (that is, not
significantly better than chance) in both disciplines but to differing degrees.
One might respond that, so long as the explanatory power of a theory is conducive to its
truth, what matters is that we have some set of weighting criteria, rather than any particular set of
weighting criteria, if it is true that those who incorporate explanatory criteria into a Bayesian
Inference scheme do better in general than those who strictly apply Bayesian Inference, as Lipton
(2004), Douven (2013) and Tesic, Eva & Hartmann (2017) claim. Bayesian Inference uses Bayes’
Rule to update the probability of a hypothesis as more evidence accumulates. Bayesian Inference
takes the following form:
𝑃𝑟(𝐻|𝐸) =

𝑃𝑟(𝐸|𝐻) ∗ Pr(𝐻)
Pr(𝐸)

Where Pr (𝐻|𝐸) is the probability of a hypothesis H given evidence E, Pr (𝐸|𝐻) is the
probability of evidence E given a hypothesis H, and Pr (H) and Pr (E) are, respectively, the
probability of H and E being true independently.
The specifics of this proposal are technical, but, put briefly, the conclusion of the
aforementioned articles is that versions of Bayesian inference that incorporate IBE into the

15

calculation of prior probabilities perform better than standard Bayesian Inference. For example,
Tesic, Eva & Hartmann (2017) claim that the IBE-supplemented version of Bayes’ Rule strictly
dominates the classical version in terms of picking the best hypothesis, that is, the following
equation yields strictly positive values:
Pr(𝐻|𝐸, 𝑋) − 𝑃𝑟(𝐻|𝐸)
Where Pr(𝐻|𝐸, 𝑋) is the probability of a hypothesis H given evidence E where hypothesis
H is considered the best explanation X of evidence E and 𝑃𝑟(𝐻|𝐸)is the probability of a hypothesis
H given evidence E where H is not considered the best explanation of E.17 Douven (2013) makes a
similar case through the use of various computer simulations, showing that an IBE-supplemented
form of Bayesian inference does better than classic Bayesian inference in terms of choosing the
theory most likely to be true, but also incurs a greater chance of choosing a false theory vis a vis
classical Bayesian updating. On this account Bayesian IBE performs better on some specifications of
an accuracy rule vis a vis the classical version of Bayes’ Rule, which means at least in some cases it is
an appropriate method to choose among theories, depending on one’s tolerance for risk.18
These responses are wanting, however, because my objection holds even if explanatoriness
really is truth-conducive and IBE respects and improves on strict application of Bayes’ Rule19 in the
way that Lipton, Douven and Tesic, Eva & Hartmann claim that it does. My objection still holds
because these accounts have still not shed any light on what the proper ordering and weighting of
theoretical virtues is. This is explicitly acknowledged by Tesic, Eva, and Hartmann:
It is important to note that we do not take ourselves to have contributed to the
debate concerning the nature of the explanatory virtues. In particular, we have said
nothing about what makes a hypothesis a good explanation of some given evidence.
See Tesic, Eva & Hartmann (2017), Pgs. 18-20 for a proof of this claim.
See Douven (2013) Pgs. 433-439 for more.
19 IBE has to respect the rules of Bayesian conditionalization on posterior probabilities in order to avoid a
dynamic Dutch book. See Teller (1973) and Van Fraassen (1989) for more.
17
18

16

In the justification of our model, we equated explanatory virtue with the Bayesian
information score because, whatever one thinks about the nature of explanatory virtue, it is
natural to think that curves with lower information scores count as better
explanations of the relevant evidence. We intend to remain ecumenical about the
nature of explanatory virtue, and merely take ourselves to be providing conditions
under which explanatory considerations can contribute to confirmation.20
Put briefly, the Bayesian information score is a criterion for model selection in Bayesian
statistics. It is possible to increase the fit of a model by adding additional parameters to the model,
but this increases the risk of overfitting. The BIS judges models on the basis of their likelihood
functions, with a penalty term that increases as the number of parameters of the model increases.
Those models with a lower BIS are taken to be superior to models with higher BIC, because they
achieve similar or identical likelihood functions with fewer parameters and so are simpler, with less
chance of overfitting to the data. But it must be said that even if we have an empirical criterion in
the form of the BIS for adjudicating among models, this doesn’t, by itself, entail that we have an
uncontroversial method for adjudicating disputes about what is in fact the best explanation of the
empirical data. This is because there are plenty examples where, other things being equal, the simpler
explanation is not always the correct one, and the BIS has a marked favoritism for simplicity in
parameters.21 Nor is the BIS the sole criterion for model-selection—over ten different selection
criteria are used with some regularity in statistical modeling. While it is among the most popular
model selection criteria, its use doesn’t by itself settle the question of how we could reliably
determine which theoretical virtues should take precedence when informing our prior probabilities.

Tesic, Marko; Eva, Benjamin & Hartmann, Stephan, Confirmation by Explanation: A Bayesian
Justification of IBE. Pg. 13. Emphasis theirs.
21 Presumably center of mass models of classical mechanics would have a lower BIS score than those that
treat mass as distributed over an area (because there are fewer parameters in center of mass models,
making them easier to calculate and functionally equivalent to distributed-mass models), but despite this
center of mass models are false.
20
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And this is important, because all Lipton, Douven, and Tesic et al. have shown is that there is some
weighting of theoretical virtues that yields better outcomes (and, in Douven’s case, only in certain
specifications of an accuracy rule) than strict Bayesian conditionalization, not that all arrangements
of the theoretical virtues yield better outcomes than strict Bayesian conditionalization.
Explanatoriness being truth-conducive, then, is only a significant point in favor of IBE if we can
specify the correct listing and hierarchy of theoretical virtues that we can then use to inform our
prior probabilities. And currently we do not even have agreement over what candidate theoretical
virtues are in fact theoretical virtues, and even less agreement on how they ought to be weighted.
These considerations point to a general problem with L&R’s strategy: Any attempt to
naturalize metaphysics by restricting theory choice preferences to just those that are naturalistically
reputable is bound to fail as an appropriate criterion of theory choice so long as there is no
antecedently specified objective ordering and weighting of theoretical virtues among working
scientists. And the prospects of ever discovering an objective ordering and weighting of theoretical
virtues among working scientists are dim. Scientists are, like everyone else, idiosyncratic in their
hierarchizing and weighting of the theoretical virtues. Some prefer desert landscapes, others
rainforests.
5 WHAT’S WRONG WITH HETEROGENEITY?
One may reasonably suspect that the claim that scientific IBE is unacceptably subjective
applies with equal warrant to traditional Bayesian conditionalization. In fact, the problem of
subjectivity might be worse in Bayesianism, insofar as scientific IBE places restrictions on the sorts
of theories we might consider most likely (namely, those that satisfice a weighted plurality of
explanatory virtues) whereas Bayesian conditionalization allows whatever assignment of prior
probabilities one might desire; so long as one updates one’s beliefs according to the dictates of
Bayes’ Rule, one is rational, irrespective of whether the assigned priors are wildly out of step with
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what is actually the case. This poses a problem, because if scientific IBE and Bayesianism both end
up as unacceptably subjective, then we have no way to determine how we should update our choice
of scientific theories in light of new evidence (because that is governed by Bayes’ Rule) and, even
more troubling, we have no guide to choosing a theory in general, since the two live methods are
both considered unacceptably subjective. Note first that this analogy between IBE and Bayesianism
ignores the existence of so-called “objective Bayesian” accounts like Rosenkrantz (1981), Berger
(2006), and Weisberg (2009) that take this criticism of subjective Bayesianism as spot-on and so seek
to identify objective constraints on the selection of priors. Whatever one thinks of this program, it is
clear that some people take subjectivity in the method of theory-choice as a reason to doubt its
effectiveness. What I want to claim, however, is that even the most subjective versions of
Bayesianism that allow for the arbitrary assignment of values to priors are not objectionably
subjective in the way that scientific IBE is.
How exactly is subjective Bayesianism less objectionably subjective than IBE? The answer
lies in the idea that Bayesian priors (and likelihoods, per Earman [1992]) eventually “wash out” in the
long run as new evidence accumulates. The mathematical result proving this claim is called the
Bernstein-von Mises Theorem.22 Put briefly, the theorem states that in the asymptotic limit Bayesian
inference will approximate the posterior distribution (i.e. the probability distribution of an event or
events conditional on newly observed data) whatever one’s initial distribution of priors is, so long as
the prior probability of a hypothesis H does not have an assignment of 1 or 0. For example, as the
number of coin flips approaches infinity, Bayesian probability estimates converge on the relative
frequencies of heads and tails, irrespective of one’s initial priors for the likelihood of heads or tails,
and so frequentist and Bayesian analyses of coin-flipping converge in the long-run.

See https://www.encyclopediaofmath.org/index.php/Bernstein-von_Mises_theorem for a proof of the
Bernstein-von Mises theorem and more besides.
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It is important to note, however, that there are many situations in which the Bernstein-Von
Mises Theorem does not hold (like in models with an infinite dimensional parameter, see Freedman
[1999]), and so the Bernstein-Von Mises Theorem doesn’t imply that the assigning of priors is
irrelevant or arbitrary in every case.23 What it does imply, however, is that there is a certain degree of
convergence in subjective Bayesianism and that the arbitrariness for which subjective Bayesianism is
often maligned for is rendered innocuous in some cases by the Bernstein-von Mises theorem. These
considerations lead Douven to offer some criteria for the application of Bayesian inference:

Bayesians, especially the more modest ones, might want to respond [to Bayesian IBE
proponents] that the Bayesian procedure is to be followed if, and only if, either (a)
priors and likelihoods can be determined with some precision and objectivity or (b)
likelihoods can be determined with some precision and priors can be expected to
‘‘wash out’’ as more and more evidence accumulates or (c) priors and likelihoods can
both be expected to wash out…In the remaining cases – they might say – we should
simply refrain from applying Bayesian reasoning.24

Contra the objection, Bayesian reasoning is not an unacceptably subjective enterprise, insofar
as we have a clear delineation of cases in which it should be applied (namely in situations where we
can reasonably expect that both priors and likelihoods approximate relative frequencies or that they
will wash out if they do not approximate relative frequencies)25 and we have, in a non-trivial subset
of cases, significant convergence upon results whatever our initial distribution of priors. This is
admittedly a weak sense of convergence, given that convergence only happens asymptotically as the

In any case where the Bernstein-von Mises Theorem doesn’t hold, priors should not be expected to
wash out, and so the selection criteria for priors significantly affects the outputs of a model unless they
are considered “uninformative priors”.
24 Douven (2005). Pg. 342.
25 Though see Gelman (2008) for an argument for the use of so-called “weakly informative priors” rather
than priors that reflect posterior distributions or arbitrary priors that eventually wash out.
23
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number of trials approaches infinity. But this convergence guarantees some consistency in results,
under appropriate conditions, and so guarantees a degree of truth-conduciveness. IBE, on the other
hand, currently has no prospects of convergence. As has been frequently mentioned, there is no
widespread agreement over the proper listing of theoretical virtues in scientific or metaphysical
practice, and there is even less agreement over how the theoretical virtues should be weighted in
either discipline. And we don’t have a particularly good reason to assume that our IBEs will
converge in the long run until we have a specification of the base rates of success and the virtues on
the basis of which we’re judging.
It may be the case that if priors do in fact wash out then one is able to assign one’s priors on
the basis of explanatory considerations, and so one can freely use IBE as they see fit, since
subjective Bayesianism places no restrictions on prior assignments at all. But this is only in the case
where the priors do wash out in the (infinite) long-run, and in the short-term Bayesian IBE will
achieve significantly different results than classical Bayesianism. Moreover, it is not guaranteed that
the results will be better, given that the arguments brought to bear by Douven and Tesic et al. only
prove that Bayesian IBE is superior (or at least preferable given a certain accuracy rule) to classical
Bayesianism if we have the correct listing and organization of theoretical virtues. In cases where we
can’t expect priors to wash out, the use of IBE is inappropriate, because it doesn’t give us any
explicit and global constraints on the assignment of prior probabilities like objective Bayesian
accounts do (just constraints on an idiosyncratic individual-by-individual basis).
6 WHITHER NATURALIZED METAPHYSICS?
If L&R’s account of NM fails, are we left with no principled distinction between naturalized
and non-naturalized metaphysics? I think that conclusion is too hasty. What the foregoing
considerations requires upon the part of the naturalized metaphysician is a reorientation away from a
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focus on a defining a naturalist criterion of theory choice and towards a view that sees metaphysical
practice as fundamentally about constructing physically possible models of reality. This view is a
descendent of various “metaphysics-as-modeling” accounts (I will refer to these views as MAM, and
to my “naturalized metaphysics-as-modeling” as NMAM) recently advanced by Peter Godfrey-Smith
(2006), Laurie Paul (2012), Timothy Williamson (2017), and others. NMAM, in contrast to MAM,
comes with greater constraints on the production of models, requiring them to not be
metaphysically possible but also physically possible, which justifies appending the word “naturalist” to
the practice of metaphysical model-building. This view can salvage one of the aims of Every Thing
Must Go, namely, supplying an account of metaphysical practice as strongly constrained by the
practice of science. I will first define some key terms and then explore how the similarities and
differences between my view of naturalized metaphysics and L&R’s view.
First, a definition of what it is to be a model is in order. My definition of model is very much
along the lines of Peter Godfrey-Smith’s:

A rough definition of the relevant sense of “model” can be given as follows: A
model is an imagined or hypothetical structure that we describe and investigate in the
hope of using it to understand some more complex, real-world “target” system or
domain. Understanding is achieved via a resemblance relation, that is, some relevant
similarity, between the model and the real-world target system… Model-based
science takes an indirect approach to representing complex or unknown processes in
the real world. The modeler’s first move is to specify and try to understand a
hypothetical structure, often using mathematical methods. It is a separate question—
and often a very subtle one—to work out what sort of similarity there is between the
model and events and processes in the real world.26

26

Godfrey-Smith (2006). Pg. 7.
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Scientific models, then, are structures that are designed to simplify the workings of an
actually existing system by isolating some set of relevant variables, whose outputs are then used to
inform further theorizing about the target system.27 Metaphysical models are largely similar, but
differ in that they are speculative, non-testable extensions of scientific theory—ways the world could
be, given what we know about physics.28
Now I will define metaphysical possibility and physical possibility. Unless one is a dyed-inthe-wool constructive empiricist, it is eminently plausible that the world could have been a different
way than it currently is. It is not a mystery or a surprise that the table on which I am writing could
have been two feet to the left, but in fact isn’t. And if the world could be different in these small
ways, it seems, by parity of reasoning, that it could be different in significant ways—that, say, the
value of the fine structure constant could be different, or that the speed at which objects in free-fall
descend due to gravity could be different, and so on. For a state of affairs to be metaphysically
possible, then, is for it to be a possible world in the classic sense of Kripke (1980) and Lewis (1986).
It is (perhaps) metaphysically possible that there exists a world with only two homogenous spinning
disks in it29; it is also metaphysically possible that there exists a world where the desk I am currently
writing on is two feet to the left. It is not metaphysically possible, so far as I can tell, that there exists
a world with round squares. Without trying to take sides on the debate over the ontology of possible
worlds, I take metaphysical possibility to be the following:

See Giere (2002) for an overview of how modeling is applied in the sciences, and what this means for
the philosophy of science generally.
28 Testability is what separates metaphysical models from highly abstract scientific models like Loop
Quantum Gravity. LQG makes predictions, and so is testable, but all of its predictions are made at the
Planck scale, and our particle colliders are very far away from achieving such high-energy states.
29 See Armstrong (1980) for the advent of this much discussed thought experiment and its relation to
Lewis’ Humean Supervenience.
27
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Metaphysical Possibility: A state of affairs a is metaphysically possible if and only if at
least one possible world w contains a.
The distinction between metaphysical and physical possibility concerns what science tells us
about the structure of our actual world. While it is metaphysically possible that there could be a
world with two homogenous spinning discs, it is not physically possible, given the laws of physics as
we currently understand them. Our world could not have contained only two homogenous spinning
discs, unless the laws of physics were significantly different from what they actually are. It is
physically possible, however, that the table on which I am writing could have been two feet to the
left; it is also physically possible that I could phase through my (solid and intact) chair due to the
effects of quantum tunneling, though the chances of this happening are so vanishingly small that
they are effectively zero. On the other hand, it is not physically possible, given our current
understanding of General Relativity, for information to be transmitted faster than the speed of light,
and so faster-than-light communication is not physically possible, though if the laws of physics were
somewhat different, it perhaps would be possible.30 So while it may be metaphysically possible that
there exists a world with two homogeneous spinning disks or that there exists a world with fasterthan-light signal transmission, neither appears physically possible given what we know about physics.
The definition of physical possibility then, is:

Physical Possibility: Some state of affairs a is physically possible if and only if some
plausible model of actual physics includes a.31

Though some processes, like the phase velocity of a wave or the group velocity of a wave, can
propagate at a speed greater than the speed of light in a vacuum, they do not transmit any information.
General Relativity doesn’t claim that processes cannot propagate faster than c, only that signal
transmission will always be less than or equal to c.
31 This distinction between metaphysical and physical possibility is expanded on from some comments
made by Tim Maudlin. See Maudlin (2007), pg. 187, for more.
30
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What is a “plausible model of actual physics”? A plausible model of actual physics is a
physical model that is isomorphic to some set or subset of physical phenomena. String Theory and
Loop Quantum Gravity are plausible models of actual physics, insofar as they are self-consistent
models of physical phenomena that subsume and unify QM and GR. Applied mathematical theory
(e.g. continuum mechanics) also yields plausible models of actual physics, though at a more
restricted scale and scope than that of GR or QM. Since it is presumably the case that any chemical,
biological, or social-scientific model won’t posit entities or laws that contradict physics (unless they
incorporate deliberate fictionalizations), they are also physically possible, and are under the purview
of naturalized MAM.
How exactly does NMAM differ from L&R’s view of NM? It differs in three significant
respects: First, NMAM does not motivate any of its naturalism by way of appeal to the preferences
of working scientists. Rather, NMAM is motivated by the recognition that those models that are of
use to the practice of science are those of the actual world, not any nearby or more distant possible
worlds. Whatever the merits of theorizing about a world with two homogeneous spinning discs, it
doesn’t appear that this kind of theorizing offers any kind of heuristic or methodological value to
science as it is currently practiced. Since naturalized metaphysics takes being of heuristic and
methodological value to scientific inquiry as its highest desideratum, those aspects of metaphysics
that are taken to not be useful for the purposes of scientific inquiry should be discarded. On this
account, the main difference between Loop Quantum Gravity and a world with two homogenous
spinning disks is that the former is a physically possible model of reality and is likely (but not
guaranteed) to be in-principle empirically verifiable, while the latter is not a physically possible model
of reality and is likely (but not guaranteed) to be in-principle empirically unverifiable. It is at least
plausible that those models that are likely in-principle empirically unverifiable offer little to no
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methodological or heuristic value to scientific inquiry, insofar as scientists are loath to adopt
research programs that cannot ever be tested.
Second, NMAM, unlike L&R’s view of naturalized metaphysics, does not endorse outright
belief in the models that it generates. Because models are not in the business of direct theorizing—
models are not meant to be exhaustive explanations and descriptions of actual phenomena, only
partial representations of a system for the purpose of further study—they also are (when properly
interpreted) not meant to engender belief in the model per se. Models are pragmatic devices, and are
free to simplify, idealize, and fictionalize, so long as they retain sufficiently similarity to the target
system. 32
Finally, NMAM also offers a strong view of science’s constraint on metaphysical practice
while avoiding the untenable appeal to a naturalist criterion of theory choice. For NMAM, what
constrains metaphysical practice is the requirement that metaphysical models be physically possible,
not just metaphysically possible. This is a fairly stringent criterion insofar as contemporary physics
enforces many constraints on what counts as physically possible. The motivation for this constraint
is, again, that science cares about the actual world, not possible worlds.33 On this view, L&R’s
metaphysical view—what they call “information-theoretic structural realism”—is (by my lights) a
physically possible model, and so merits consideration and analysis to see how well it fits with what
we know to be the case and what fruits it might bear. But it is not any better, in an absolute sense,
than any other model that satisfies the constraint of physical possibility. We might prefer one model

Of course, there is great controversy over what “sufficient similarity to the target system” entails,
especially in cases of idealization and fictionalization. Those concerns are beyond the ken of this paper,
however.
33 And also because we have much more reliable knowledge about the actual world versus those that are
merely possible, but not actual. But this is a separate argument, and though I am sympathetic to L&R’s
critique of analytic metaphysics, to explain and justify why this is the case would take us too far beyond
the subject of this paper.
32
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to another for a whole host of reasons, and some of those reasons might include judgments about
how accurately they actually do model reality. But, assuming that we can’t determine which model of
reality (say, Loop Quantum Gravity vs. String Theory) is the “best” on the basis of its theoretical
virtues alone (and the preceding sections should indicate that a naturalized IBE probably can’t do
this), then naturalized MAM encourages a pluralism regarding model selection and model-building.
This is a feature, not a bug. Models are by necessity simplified and incomplete, and multiple models
can represent different views of the same phenomenon and convey information regarding those
different aspects. A healthy pluralism, then, is methodologically beneficial, and, because of the
constraint of physical possibility, we can rest assured that our metaphysical inquiry won’t venture
too far into the thicket of possible worlds and thereby lose its usefulness to scientific inquiry.
There are two major differences between modeling in NMAM and modeling in the sciences
that need to be addressed, however. The first difference between scientific models and NMAM
models is the former need not always satisfy the criterion of physical possibility that I’ve forwarded
as a criterion of model building in NMAM. Simple models of a pendulum accurately predict the
motion of pendulums in our world, but do not contain a coefficient for friction, meaning that simple
model pendulums are perpetual motion machines, which are physically impossible. This is not a
problem for NMAM, if one acknowledges that the purposes of modeling in science and NMAM are
somewhat different. The purpose of modeling in science is, again, to be able to gather more
information about a target system by simplifying, idealizing, or fictionalizing its workings through
the use of an indirect structure that captures some of the relations among the target system’s parts.
The point of modeling in NMAM is to encourage, inter alia, the possible conceptual and empirical
extensions of already existing physical theory, and by doing so encourage scientists and philosophers
to pursue new avenues of inquiry. NMAM isn’t about information-gathering so much as it is about
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encouraging the furtherance of existing research programs34 and the generation of new ones by
working scientists. The second difference is that models in science are usually local rather than global.
This characteristic of models is foregone in NMAM, because NMAM’s purpose is heuristically
useful speculation about the way our actual world could possibly be. If NMAM were meant to
generate true facts about the world, rather than serve as a methodological handmaiden to scientific
inquiry, then the constraint of locality would be more well-motivated, as it is in scientific modeling.
So far, I have differentiated NMAM from L&R’s view of NM and from standard MAM, but
I haven’t given an example that I take to be representative of what NMAM is. I will now briefly
present an exemplar of NMAM, Newtonian atomism, and hopefully illustrate through this example
how NMAM can aid scientific inquiry.
Newton’s atomism is situated within a lively tradition of mechanistic atomist philosophy
that spans from the 17th to 19th centuries, a tradition that was dominant until the advent of Special
Relativity in the 20th century. Classical mechanical philosophy, advocated by Robert Boyle, Thomas
Hobbes, Rene Descartes, Pierre Gassendi, and others, treats all of nature as consisting in the
movements of homogeneous matter, whose movements are defined by appeal to micro-scale
properties found at ever-decreasing scales of extension. While not all mechanical philosophers were
atomists (Descartes believed that matter consisted in extension and was infinitely divisible, for
example), many natural philosophers and scientists of the era found atomism and mechanical
philosophy kindred intellectual spirits and endorsed the former as a model of the latter. The most
notable advocate of this view before Newton was Robert Boyle, who endorsed a variant of atomism
known as corpusclarianism. But Newton’s atomism was different from his predecessors, insofar as it
was explicitly informed by his foundational work on dynamics, forces, and the laws of motion,

34

I mean the term “research program” roughly in the sense of Lakatos (1978).
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whereas previous mechanistic models like Boyle’s had trouble explaining all of natural phenomena
through only the size, shape, and motion of individual particles without the assistance of Newtonian
Dynamics. Newton justified his atomism by appealing to atomism’s ease in incorporating
phenomena into the mechanistic framework.

All Bodies seem to be composed of hard Particles: For otherwise Fluids would not
congeal; as Water, Oils, Vinegar, and Spirit or Oil of Vitriol do by freezing; Mercury,
by dissolving the Mercury and evaporating the Flegm…Even the Rays of Light seem
to be hard Bodies; for otherwise they would not retain different Properties in their
different Sides. And therefore Hardness may be reckon’d the Property of all
uncompounded Matter. At least, this seems to be as evident as the universal
Impenetrability of Matter…Particles being Solids, are incomparably harder than any
porous Bodies compounded of them; even so very hard, as never to wear or break in
pieces…While the Particles continue entire, they may compose Bodies of one and
the same Nature and Texture in all Ages: But should they wear away. Or break in
pieces, the Nature of Things depending on them, would be changed…the Changes
of corporeal Things are to be placed only in the various Separations and new
Associations and Motions of these permanent Particles; Compound Bodies being apt
to break…These principles I consider, not as occult Qualities, supposed to result
from the specific Forms of Things but as general Laws of Nature, by which the
Things themselves are form’d; their Truth appearing to us by Phenomena, though
their causes be not yet discover’d.35

Note that Newton’s justification of atomism makes no reference to any experiments. Rather,
Newton appealed to the fact that 1. Atomism was empirically adequate, accommodating the

35

Opticks, Query 31, pgs. 389, 400-401.
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scientific phenomena to which it was taken to apply (e.g. the freezing of fluids, evaporation of solids
in liquids); and 2. That it cohered with a mechanistic account of nature.
It is important to stress again that, at that time, there had been no experimental confirmation
of the atomist thesis. In fact, it would take until Roger Dalton formulated his version of atomism
before atomism became a live empirical hypothesis that made testable predictions, and atomism
didn’t really assume the mantle of a bona fide scientific research program until Maxwell presented his
kinetic theory of gases, which eventually culminated in a verification of atomism via Jean Perrin’s
experiments with Brownian motion in the early 20th century.36 Because of these considerations, I
take Newtonian atomism to be an exemplar of NMAM for its time period. It constructed a
physically possible and general model of reality, in advance of empirical confirmation or
disconfirmation, that served as a heuristically useful model for future chemists and physicists despite
its lack of empirical confirmation. Because of its heuristic value, it significantly aided the burgeoning
empirical research program of atomic theory, which is now no longer just a physically possible
model of reality but also well-confirmed science consensus. The cash value of NMAM, then, lies in
the construction of physically possible models of reality that are of heuristic and/or methodological
benefit to existing or nascent scientific research programs.
7 CONCLUSIONS
After profiling Ladyman & Ross’ account of naturalized metaphysics, I argued that their
justification for their main methodological prescription, the PNC, was ill-motivated, predicated as it
was on an ill-conceived deference to the theory-choice preferences of working scientists. I then
explored how L&R’s deference to the theory-choice preferences of working scientists rendered the
prospect of naturalized metaphysics incoherent, because taking L&R’s principle of deference

36

See Chalmers (2009, 2014) for more on the atomist thesis from the 17th to 20th centuries.
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seriously forces us to let in all of the theory choice preferences that scientists do in fact have, and
those are not significantly different than the ones the metaphysician has. I subsequently critiqued
Ladyman’s commitment to treating IBE as truth-conducive in scientific inquiry and claimed that
any view of naturalized metaphysics that attempted to offer a naturalized criterion of theory choice
was bound to fail. I then answered an objection that analogized IBE and Bayesian
Conditionalization and claimed that the former but not the latter was unacceptably subjective
because IBE so far has had no reasonable progress toward convergence. Finally, I offered an
alternate view of naturalized metaphysical practice that sees the purpose of metaphysics as one of
constructing physically possible models of reality, a view that I take to salvage many of Ladyman &
Ross’ methodological prescriptions without relying on a view of scientific constraint that essentially
refers to the practices of working scientists. I closed by presenting Newtonian atomism as a
paradigm case of NMAM.
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